These deductions combine to show that the Eighth Army maximised its fighting power by understanding its limits and that it had the confidence to adapt to its mission. There was a broader investment in logistics that gave commanders greater tactical options. Thirdly, that the quantitative and qualitative edge the Eighth Army had was not enough to guarantee victory. This was exploited by empowered Army level staff and centralised authority. Secondly, that the Eighth Army had a bottom-up learning culture that utilised the best ideas to maximise doctrine. But leadership must be underpinned by effective staff systems. Firstly, that leadership matters in maximising fighting power. Using this definition, this article presents three core deductions. 4 This provides a better framework from which to look at the battle. 3 The current Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations defines it as ‘a concept that describes the operational effectiveness of armed forces’ and breaks it down into three distinct elements: moral, conceptual, and physical components.

Martin van Creveld described it in 1980 as “the sum total of qualities that make armies fight” but this doesn’t provide a framework to expand a practitioner’s understanding. As a term, ‘fighting power’ is unhelpfully defined. To help dispel this myth, this article takes the modern definition of fighting power and expands three key deductions underpinning the Eighth Army’s success in 1942. The Eighth Army was opposed by Rommel who famously declared “the British have some of the best doctrine in the world… it is fortunate their officers do not read it”. There is an historic irony in writing this. This article looks at the battle from a modern perspective with the aim of critically evaluating elements of modern British doctrine. Arguably, studying warfare is more important for military professionals than studying war. Much of the literature on Alamein is in this area. 2 War is strategic, it asks ‘why’ battles are fought.

Using a modern academic view, Jim Storr notes that there is a distinction between studying war and warfare. Since then, the battle and the wider campaign has been studied extensively with an average of one book being published about it every three months since 1945.

After Alamein, we never had a defeat” helping embed the battle in popular imagination. Speaking of the victory Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously declared “before Alamein we never had a victory. The battle saw the Allied Eighth Army commanded by General Montgomery breach an obstacle belt and defeat their opponents in the desert. The second battle of El Alamein took place over 23 October to 4 November 1942.

Martin van creveld fighting power